The army of Israel admits “failed to protect” civilians on October 7

A file image of the Israeli soldiers in the Gaza strip | Photo credit: AP

An Israeli army investigation has established that Hamas managed to make the deadest attack in Israeli history On October 7, 2023Because the much stronger Israeli army misunderstood the intentions of the militant group and underestimated its capabilities.

The findings, published on Thursday (February 27, 2025), could pressure Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to launch a wider investigation to examine the political decision -making process that preceded the attack.

Many Israelis believe that the failures of October 7 extend beyond the army and accuse Mr. Netanyahu for a failed policy of discouragement and restraint in the years that led to the attack. This approach included the allowance of the Qatar to send cash suitcases to Gaza and the evolution of Hamas’s rival, the international Palestinian authority.

The prime minister did not take responsibility, saying that he will answer difficult questions only after the war, which has been interrupted for almost six weeks by a tennious cessation. Despite the public pressure, including the families of the approximately 1,200 people killed in the attack on October 7 and the 251 taken as hostages in Gaza, Mr. Netanyahu resisted calls to a commission of inquiry.

The main findings of the army were that the most powerful and sophisticated military in the region read Hamas’s intentions, underestimated its capacities and were completely unprepared for the surprise attack by thousands of strongly armed militants in the early hours of a major Jewish holiday.

The military findings are in accordance with the previous conclusions reached by officials and analysts. The army launched only a summary of the report, and the military officials presented its findings.

“October 7 was a complete failure,” said a military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, in accordance with the regulations.

A central misconception was that Hamas, who took over the Gaza control from the Palestinian authority in 2007, was more interested in the governance of the territory than in Israel’s struggle, the investigation found. The military also misused the capabilities of the militant group.

Military planners considered that, in the worst case, Hamas could stag with an invasion of up to eight border points, the official said. In fact, Hamas had over 60 attack routes.

The information evaluated following the attack showed that Hamas was close to staging on the offensive on three previous occasions, but it was delayed for unknown reasons, the official said.

The official said that in the hours before the attack, there were signs that something was AMIS, including when Hamas Fighters changed his phones to the Israeli SIM books.

The perception that Hamas did not want the decision -making factors to take measures that could have thwart the attack. The Israeli military official said that the information shows that Yahya Sinwar, the main attack of the October 7 attack, which was killed in October last year, started planning it since 2017.

With the military outside the guard in a vacation weekend, Hamas has launched a hard rocket wave that allowed thousands of fighters to burst through the security fence or fly over Hang Gliders. They removed the surveillance cameras and quickly overwhelmed hundreds of soldiers stationed along the border.

From there they advanced to the key intersections of the highway and attacked the troops sent to the area, including some tall officers, disrupting the military command and control, according to a second military official, who also spoke under anonymity conditions.

For the first three hours of the attack, the fighters in Hamas dressed through the border communities and a music festival with little resistance. Then most of the 251 hostages were taken, and most people were killed, the official said. The official said that the chaos led to friendly fire incidents, although he said there are not many, without revealing a figure.

It took hours for hours for the military to regain their control and days until the area was completely cleaned by the militants.

According to the first official, the report blamed the military that he was too confident in his knowledge and did not show enough doubt in his basic concepts and beliefs. He did not blame any soldiers or individual officers, but it is likely to open the way for a account in the military and possible dismissals.

Some high-ranking officers have already resigned, including the former head of military information and the general general of Israel, General General Herzi Halevi, who descends next week.